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T HIS Article assesses the case for federalizing public education in theUnited States. In Part I, I argue that democracy requires a principle
of equitable sharing pursuant to which the goods and bads of social life
must be fairly distributed among all society's members. Part II explores
what equitable sharing says about society's obligation to provide for chil-
dren's education, and concludes that in the modern world it requires soci-
ety to afford all children access to a formalized and relatively equal
educational opportunity of some type.
Part III examines how society might go about fulfilling that obliga-
tion. Assuming that democratic principles require that parents have a pri-
mary role in raising their children, subject to society's right to intervene in
that relationship in order to protect children's right to comparable educa-
tional opportunities, Part III considers the merits of total private provision
versus total public provision versus some combined approach such as a
voucher system where the government finances education but parents
choose the particular setting. It concludes that under relatively egalitarian
social conditions all three approaches might produce comparable educa-
tional opportunities, and that under inegalitarian conditions none are
likely to do so, although a government-run or a voucher system would
likely come closer than total privatization.
Part IV examines in the abstract the responsibility of government to
provide for equal educational opportunity in a federal system. It con-
cludes that the national government must assume that responsibility to the
extent necessary to ensure comparability, that under egalitarian social
conditions both national and lower level provision of education might suf-
fice, and that under inegalitarian conditions total or substantial federaliza-
tion seems the most viable way to minimize educational inequalities.
Finally, Part V examines the real-world context of the United States. It
concludes that total privatization would likely produce a highly stratified
and unequal system of education, that at a minimum full federal financing
of education seems necessary to promote comparable educational oppor-
tunity, and that whether the federal or state and local governments are
more suited to administer other aspects of education than financing is an
open question.
I. THE DEMOCRATIC REQUIREMENT OF EQUITABLE SHARING
I call the conception of democracy I propose equitable sharing,
meaning that all the goods (and bads) of social life must be fairly distrib-
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uted among all society's members.' One route to equitable sharing posits
the inherently equal moral worth of every individual, and presupposes so-
ciety as based on a social compact unanimously agreed to through an egal-
itarian interaction among those individuals.2 Under those conditions, I
1. Resonances of equitable sharing are present in the moral underpinnings of
this society, in particular the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths
to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
And they are present in the thinking of many political philosophers. See, e.g., RoB-
ERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 311-12 (1989) ("The close connection
between democracy and certain kinds of equality leads to a powerful moral conclu-
sion: If freedom, self-development, and the advancement of shared interests are
good ends, and if persons are intrinsically equal in their moral worth, then oppor-
tunities for attaining these goods should be distributed equally to all persons.
Considered from this perspective, the democratic process becomes nothing less
than a requirement of distributive justice."); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT § 27 (1690), available at http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr05.txt
("Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left
it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state
nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that ex-
cludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable
property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once
joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for
others."); KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAM pt. I (1875), available at
http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ch0l.htm ("In a higher
phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to
the division of labor, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical
labor, has vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but life's prime
want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-around develop-
ment of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abun-
dantly-only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its
entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to
each according to his needs!"); JoHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971) ("All
social values-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-
respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all,
of those values is to everyone's advantage."); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTICE
84 (1983) (arguing that a democratic social contract requires "that every political
community must attend to the needs of its members as they collectively under-
stand those needs; that the goods that are distributed must be distributed in pro-
portion to need; and that the distribution must recognize and uphold the
underlying equality of membership"); Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of
Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 67, 69 (S. Benhabib ed., 1996)
("The basis of legitimacy in democratic institutions is to be traced back to the
presumption that the instances which claim obligatory power for themselves do so
because their decisions represent an impartial standpoint said to be equally in the
interests of all.").
2. To approximate an egalitarian interaction is the purpose of Ackerman's
Spaceship, Habermas's "ideal speech situation," and Rawls's Veil of Ignorance. See
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIALJUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 6, 11, 24-45 (1980) (hy-
pothesizing, as a basis of establishing "the foundation of all claims of right," a dia-
logue among space travelers about to create a political community on a new and
uninhabited planet and constrained by a "principle of Neutrality" that illegitimates
assertions that one's "conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of
his fellow citizens" and that one "is intrinsically superior to one or more of his
370
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contend, people would only agree to a social compact containing a pnnc-
ple of equitable sharing.
Since the equal worth and egalitarian interaction constraints dictate
an egalitarian outcome, there is an obvious circularity here. Nevertheless,
the constraints are necessary because without them a social compact might
produce results inconsistent with democratic principles. For example, a
person in a disadvantageous position might agree to all sorts of heinous
arrangements, such as slavery, that are hard to reconcile with the word
democracy.3 Under egalitarian conditions, it is hard to imagine that ra-
tional people would ever agree either to submit to slavery or to cooperate
with each other in some venture unless all were guaranteed an equitable
share of their joint efforts. Consequently, a social compact arising from
and perpetuating power imbalances is unconscionable and not fully
democratic .4
A second route to equitable sharing presupposes that people are born
into or embedded in pre-existing societies from which exit is physically
and psychologically difficult, such that the occasion to enter into an egali-
fellow citizens"); JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION 57-94 (1993) (advancing, as a means of establishing the validity of con-
tested norms, a "discourse ethics" that "rules out all external and internal coercion
other than the force of the better argument and thereby rules out all motives other
than that of the cooperative search for truth," and that requires valid norms to
fulfill the condition that "all affected can accept the consequences and the side
effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of every-
one's interests"); RAWLS, supra note 1, at 12, 136-42 ("The principles of justice are
chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or
disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the
contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is
able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles ofjustice
are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.").
3. By definition, democracy stipulates people's right to participate in societal
decision making. To willingly bargain away that right, although participatory as an
isolated act, produces an undemocratic result because thereafter the person no
longer has the right to participate. Therefore, the right to participate in societal
decision making must remain inalienable in a democratic society. See, e.g., DAHL,
supra note 1, at 114 (distinguishing between the permissible delegation of decision
making pursuant to a revocable grant of authority and the impermissibility of
alienating full control over decision making as inconsistent with democratic
principles).
4. See, e.g., Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95
HARv. L. REv. 741 (1982) (identifying fairness and efficiency as the ethical force
underlying the principle that people should be held to their bargains; arguing that
bargains lacking in fairness and efficiency are consequently unworthy of full en-
forcement on grounds of unconscionability; and identifying as factors giving rise to
unconscionable bargains the exploitation by one party of another's distress, bar-
gaining incapacity, and lack of knowledge); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality,
Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 445, 447, 491 (1994) (argu-
ing that "the private orderings of people who belong to a class-oriented society will
passively, though relentlessly, reinforce the existing class structure," and that "[i]f
one's consent to the terms of a contract is the function of class-based injuries, it is
hard to defend the bargain on either fairness or efficiency grounds").
2010] 371
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tarian social compact never arises.5 Nonetheless, people adhere to the
principle that all its members are of inherently equal moral worth out of
feelings of solidarity among fellow members, or because equal worth is
seen as intrinsic to the concept of membership.6 Such a society, I con-
tend, would adopt a requirement of equitable sharing (as well as other
democratic principles) because equitable sharing necessarily follows from
a commitment to equal moral worth.
Again, there is circularity in that the premise of equal moral worth
dictates an egalitarian outcome. But, again, the constraint is needed be-
cause without it outcomes incompatible with the meaning of the word de-
mocracy might result. For example, without the constraint of equal moral
worth in a society into which people are born or embedded and from
which they cannot feasibly exit, a powerful minority might seize control
5. See, e.g., MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OFJUSTICE 150 (2d
ed. 1998) ("[T]o say that the members of a society are bound by a sense of commu-
nity is not simply to say that a great many of them profess communitarian senti-
ments and pursue communitarian aims, but rather that they conceive their identity
... as defined to some extent by the community of which they are a part. For
them, community describes not just what they have as fellow citizens but also what
they are, not a relationship they choose (as in a voluntary association) but an at-
tachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of their
identity.").
6. See, e.g., id. at 32-35, 168-73 (advancing, as a means to achieve the same
ends in terms of interpersonal relations as a focus on justice and individual rights,
sentiments of benevolence, fraternity, and love arising out of the experience of
community). Sandel states:
[I]n so far as our constitutive understandings comprehend a wider sub-
ject than the individual alone, whether a family or tribe or city or class or
nation or people, to this extent they define a community in the constitu-
tive sense. And what marks such a community is not merely a spirit of
benevolence, or the prevalence of communitarian values, or even certain
"shared final ends" alone, but a common vocabulary of discourse and a
background of implicit practices and understandings within which the
opacity of the participants is reduced if never finally dissolved. In so far
as justice depends for its pre-eminence on the separateness or bounded-
ness of persons in the cognitive sense, its priority would diminish as that
opacity faded and this community deepened.
Id. at 172; see also WALZER, supra note 1, at 64 (arguing that the members of a
democratic political community owe each other "the communal provision of secur-
ity and welfare" because "[i]f we did not provide for one another . . . we would
have no reason to form and maintain political communities"). Walzer character-
izes that duty as based on
an agreement to redistribute the resources of the members in accordance
with some shared understanding of their needs, subject to ongoing politi-
cal determination in detail. The contract is a moral bond. It connects
the strong and the weak, the lucky and the unlucky, the rich and the
poor, creating a union that transcends all differences of interest, drawing
its strength from history, culture, religion, language, and so on. Argu-
ments about communal provision are, at the deepest level, interpreta-
tions of that union. The closer and more inclusive it is, the wider the
recognition of needs, the greater the number of social goods that are
drawn into the sphere of security and welfare.
WALZER, supra note 1, at 82-83.
372
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and deny others the right to participate in societal decision making. Or,
although all have a formal right to participate, without a requirement of
equitable sharing a majority might ignore or exploit the minority and ap-
propriate for itself the lion's share of the goods of social life. Such a soci-
ety is not worthy of being called democratic.
Equitable sharing, of course, is a vague term. Consequently, even
those who adhere to the principle are likely to disagree over the particu-
lars of what it requires in practice. To some, equitable sharing may re-
quire the equal distribution of all the goods of social life;7 to others, the
distribution of goods in accordance with need;8 and to still others, the
provision of a basic minimum.9 For this Article, the question is what equi-
table sharing requires as regards children's access to an education.
II. EQUITABLE SHARING AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
Education, broadly conceived, encompasses all one learns throughout
life, and comes from many sources. This Article focuses on formalized
schooling at the elementary and secondary levels as generally provided
today in public or private schools throughout the world. In some con-
texts, like a preliterate tribal society, equitable sharing may not require
formalized schooling at all. In modern times it does, as evidenced by the
universality of formalized schooling and its centrality to a successful social
life.10
Formalized schooling in a democratic society serves two primary pur-
poses. First is self-development: to assist children to acquire the capacities,
7. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Back to Socialist Basics, 207 NEW LEFr REv. 3, 11 (1994)
("The principle of equality says that the amount of amenity and burden in one
person's life should be roughly comparable to that in any other's.").
8. See, e.g., MARX, supTa note 1 ("From each according to his ability, to each
according to his needs!"); WALZER, supfa note 1, at 84 (noting that "goods that are
distributed must be distributed in proportion to need").
9. See, e.g., JOHN BAKER, ARGUING FOR EQUALIHY 3-10, 49 (1987) (arguing that
true equality requires society "to give everyone the means to develop their capaci-
ties in a satisfying and fulfilling way," and that this requires every person to have
their basic needs met, the minimization of economic inequality, the right to mean-
ingful work, and the democratization of all aspects of social life); CAROL GOULD,
RETHINKING DEMOCRACY 35-71, 209-14 (1988) (arguing that the value of freedom
includes the affirmative right to the social and material conditions necessary for
realizing individual self-development, that the principle of equality requires that
this right be equally available to all, and that the right includes a right of access to
the means of subsistence); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 227-30,
241-47 (1990) (arguing that the principle ofjustice and equality requires sufficient
property, to the extent society is able to provide it, to enable all to meet the basic
needs and develop the basic capabilities necessary for a decent human life).
10. Other institutions like the family and the church, as well as self-learning
and informal relationships, also play important educational roles. And there are
ongoing debates over which aspects of children's education belong in school, and
in particular in public school, and which should or may be provided elsewhere.
Debates over home education and vouchers are examples, and I will allude to
them as the discussion proceeds. The ultimate question is what equitable sharing
requires as regards formalized schooling.
3732010]
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knowledge, and skills to prosper and achieve fulfillment as self-determin-
ing adults of inherently equal moral worth." Second is socialization/ac-
culturation: to assist children to acquire the knowledge needed to
understand and participate effectively in the democratic process and to
cultivate among children respect for and the ability to interact with others
as beings of inherently equal moral worth. 12 Without capacities-without
the ability to read and write, to reason and analyze-most people would be
hard-pressed to provide for themselves, to make informed decisions about
what is in their best interests, or to attend adequately to the needs of their
children. Therefore, equitable sharing requires access to these capacities.
Without an understanding of how society's political and economic institu-
tions function, and without the ability to evaluate the pros and cons of
public issues, few people could participate intelligently in the democratic
process. Therefore, equitable sharing requires access to this knowledge.
Without mutual respect among its members and a willingness to give
others their due, a society would have difficulty in functioning democrati-
11. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 139 ("A system of liberal education
provides children with a sense of the very different lives that could be theirs-so
that, as they approach maturity, they have the cultural materials available to build
lives equal to their evolving conceptions of the good."); JOHN DEWEY, The Child and
the Curriculum (1902), in THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY & THE CHILD AND THE CURRICU-
LUM 179, 187 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1990) (1915) ("The child is the starting-
point, the center, and the end. His development, his growth, is the ideal. It alone
furnishes the standard. To the growth of the child all studies are subservient; they
are instruments valued as they serve the needs of growth. Personality, character, is
more than subject-matter. Not knowledge or information, but self-realization, is
the goal.").
12. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is re-
quired in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship."); see also JOHN
DEWEY, The School and Society (1915), in THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY & THE CHILD AND
THE CURRICULUM, supra note 11, at 29 (asserting that the goal of education should
be "to make each one of our schools an embryonic community life.... When the
school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within such a
little community, saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with
the instruments of effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guar-
anty of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious"); AMY GUTMANN,
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 42 (1987) ("[A] democratic state recognizes the value of
political education in predisposing children to accept those ways of life that are
consistent with sharing the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in a demo-
cratic society. A democratic state is therefore committed to allocating educational
authority in such a way as to provide its members with an education adequate to
participate in democratic politics, to choosing among (a limited range of) good
lives, and to sharing in the several sub-communities, such as families, that impart
identity to the lives of its citizens."); MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL
EDUCATION 102-03 (1999) ("Future citizens must be taught to exemplify the virtues
characteristic of a liberal democracy ... to respect and value the democratic pro-
cess, . . . to think critically and carefully . . . [and] to tolerate and respect other
citizens and their differences.").
374 [Vol. 55: p. 369
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cally and in complying with the principle of equitable sharing. Therefore,
equitable sharing requires society to cultivate mutual respect.
Knowledge, skills, and acculturation can certainly be, and are, ob-
tained elsewhere than through formalized schooling. But, absent such
schooling, their attainment may not adequately meet people's needs nor
comport with equitable sharing. Without formalized schooling, people
would have to find other means of obtaining for themselves and their chil-
dren the skills and knowledge needed to function successfully in social
life. Some might self-educate. But the skills and knowledge needed to
thrive in the modern world often demand skilled and knowledgeable
teachers. Relatively few seem capable of teaching themselves or their chil-
dren as well as experienced professionals. Some might employ private
tutors. But that would likely be beyond the means of most people. Some
employers might provide education for their workers if unable to find
qualified people. But on-the-job training would often likely consist of the
specific skills and knowledge needed to perform particular tasks, rather
than the more generalized education that helps prepare people for all
aspects of social life-from an understanding of how society functions to
the ability to create or interpret a work of art.
Consequently, while absent formalized schooling a few might receive
a high-level education, some (perhaps many) would likely receive little or
none, and the quality of education people receive would likely be highly
uneven. This does not comport with the democratic principle of equitable
sharing. Society must somehow provide people with the opportunity for a
formalized education. Moreover, because education is so critical to peo-
ple's ability to prosper in modern times, I contend that the principle of
equal moral worth and the requirement of equitable sharing mandate so-
ciety to ensure that all children have access to a relatively equal educa-
tional opportunity-i.e., a comparable opportunity to advance
educationally as far as their abilities, interests, and willingness to strive al-
low-at least through elementary and secondary school.1
3
13. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 ("Today, education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments. . . . Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms."). Whether democratic principles also require comparable ac-
cess for all to a college-level education, or permit people's earnings to depend on
their fortuitously acquired native abilities, are relevant and debatable questions.
But they are beyond the scope of this Article. The contention at this point is sim-
ply that until their late teens, the time in this society at which children are assumed
to become adults and must begin to assume adult responsibilities, equitable shar-
ing requires that all children have access to comparable educational opportunities
through secondary school. Whether it is consistent with democratic principles and
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Comparability does not necessarily mean sameness of treatment in all
instances, however, because people's needs differ. Rather, it means the
same or similar treatment when people are similarly situated' 4 and pro-
portionate responsiveness to need when needs differ.15 Proportionate re-
sponsiveness is required when needs differ because equal treatment would
14. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (holding that
exclusion of women from Virginia Military Institute and provision of parallel pro-
gram for women at separate school violates equal protection because "the Court
has repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor state government acts compati-
bly with the equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to wo-
men, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature-equal opportunity
to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual
talents and capacities"); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25
(1982) (holding that exclusion of men from state-supported nursing school vio-
lates equal protection). The Court in Hogan reasoned that:
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classifica-
tion is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concern-
ing the roles and abilities of males and females. Care must be taken in
ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and ster-
eotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or "protect"
members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an
inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is
illegitimate.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-25.
15. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 56 (1999)
(holding that Individuals with Disabilities Education Act's requirement that school
authorities furnish services designed to meet the "unique needs" of the disabled in
order to assure them a "free appropriate public education" requires provision to
student in wheelchair and on ventilator of related nursing services without which
student would not be able to attend school); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)
(holding Civil Rights Act of 1974's prohibition against discrimination based on
national origin requires school authorities to take affirmative steps to rectify En-
glish language deficiencies of non-native English speaking students). But see Bd. of
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) (holding Education of All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act's requirement of a "free appropriate public education" for the handi-
capped does not require an educational opportunity commensurate with other
students but only services necessary to enable the handicapped to obtain "some
educational benefit," such that sign-language interpreter need not be provided for
deaf student receiving specialized instruction and performing above average). If
that is a proper reading of the Act, it falls short of what equitable sharing and
comparability require. While cost and other administrative factors impact the spe-
cifics, limiting the handicapped to "some" educational benefit while providing
more to the non-handicapped is hard to reconcile with those requirements. See,
e.g., Erin E. Buzuvis, Survey Says. . . A Critical Analysis of the New Title IX Policy and a
Proposal for Refonn, 91 IowA L. Riv. 821 (2006) (arguing with regard to women's
participation in athletics that a principle of "substantial proportionality" underlies
the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex in Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 and that the implementing regulations do not fully con-
form to that principle, and recommending modifications of the regulations to
better further the proportionality principle); Michael A. Rabell, Structural Discrimi-
nation and the Rights of the Disabled, 74 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1452, 1470-80 (1986) (advo-
cating a structural approach to evaluating claims of discrimination against the
disabled in recognition of the fact that "the critical analytical problem of discrimi-
nation in the handicapped context now is .. . one of redesigning social structures
and institutions to make them more responsive to the needs of the disabled seg-
ment of the population," and touting in the educational context a "commensurate
8
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address the needs of some more than others and, thus, would not be com-
parable for all. Given the complexity of determining in practice what
comparability requires, as well as human fallibility, it may be impossible to
achieve total comparability of educational opportunity no matter how chil-
dren are educated. Even if it were possible, other democratic values may
at times compete with children's educational needs. The task for demo-
cratic theory and practice, then, is to strike an appropriate balance be-
tween children's needs and competing democratic values, and to accord
children comparable educational opportunity as far as practicable under
the circumstances.
III. PROMOTING COMPARABLE EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
A. Parental Versus Governmental Child Rearing
One way to promote comparable educational opportunity might be
for the government to raise all children from birth in comparable environ-
ments and in comparable ways. 16 While achieving total comparability in a
government-run system responsible for raising and educating large num-
bers of children would be difficult, an efficiently run system with that as a
primary goal might come close. It does not necessarily follow, however,
that parental child rearing must be abolished.
First, if, as many believe, parents have an affinity with their children
that generally leads them to be more attentive than others to their chil-
dren's needs,1 7 parental child rearing may contribute to children's educa-
tion and to ensuring comparable educational opportunities for all
opportunity standard" that balances the needs of the disabled against the opportu-
nities provided to other children).
16. See, e.g., PAULA RAYMON, THE KIBBUTZ COMMUNITY AND NATION BUILDING
53-55, 233-36 (1981) (discussing the communal living arrangements of children in
the early years of the Israeli kibbutzim as based on the "socialist principle that the
community should replace the family" and that "[t]he kibbutz and not the parents
would provide for the child," and the subsequent abandonment of the arrange-
ment due to the tension it caused particularly for mothers who desired a more
family oriented approach to child rearing).
17. See, e.g., JOHN ALcOCK, THE TRIUMPH OF SOCIOBIOLOGY 201, 203 (2001)
("[Natural] selection has evidently favored people with the motivational mecha-
nisms, emotional systems, and intellectual capacities that enable us to learn kin-
ship categories, establish kin-based links with others, educate others about
genealogical relationships, and feel a sense of solidarity and cooperativeness with
those identified as relatives, especially with close relatives. . . . These feelings influ-
ence our decisions about how much we are willing to invest in helping off-spring
and thus they affect our interactions with spouses, children, and other compo-
nents of extended families, reconstituted or otherwise."); Stephen G. Gilles, On
Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 937, 940 (1996) (advo-
cating constitutional protection for parental rights regarding their children's edu-
cation on the ground that "parents are more likely to pursue the child's best
interest as they define it than is the state to pursue the child's best interest as the
state defines it . . . [because] parents have better incentives to act in their chil-
dren's perceived best interests than do the state and its delegates, and will conse-
quently be, on average, more faithful educational guardians").
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children. Attentive parents may be willing to devote more time to their
children's education, and may be better able to identify their children's
educational needs, than governmental personnel responsible for collec-
tively rearing and teaching children, however well-trained and caring
those officials may be. Even if governmental child rearing would contrib-
ute in some respects to comparable educational opportunities for chil-
dren, parental child rearing might contribute in others. It seems
impossible to say in the abstract which approach is on balance superior.
Perhaps some combination of parental and governmental responsibility
for rearing and educating children would be best.18
Second, the principle of equal moral worth, from which children's
right to comparable educational opportunities derives, may also require
that parents have a right to raise their own children even if the result is
something less than fully comparable educational opportunities. A full
discussion of parental rights is beyond the scope of this Article, although
the evidently near-universal practice of parental child rearing throughout
history lends support to parental child rearing as a right that a democratic
society should recognize.1 9 In light of that history, I assume here that
18. See, e.g., GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 22-47 (considering and ultimately
rejecting a "family state" model of education where a centralized state has exclu-
sive authority over children's education, a "state of families" model where parents
have exclusive authority, and a "state of individuals" model where children are
educated by impartial professional educators unconstrained by political or paren-
tal authority, and advocating instead a "democratic state of education" that shares
educational authority among citizens, parents, and professional educators); Anne
L. Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with Equality? The Legal Implications of the Egalitarian
Family, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 4 (2008) (arguing that a liberal egalitarian society, in
order to reconcile a commitment both to parental prerogatives and equal opportu-
nity for children, may on the one hand be required to support parental child rear-
ing so as to "attenuate the link between parents' financial circumstances and
children's access to food, shelter, health care, and education," and may on the
other hand be entitled to impinge on parental prerogatives that impede equal
opportunity such as by insisting that children attend public school).
19. See, e.g., LLOYD DEMAUSE, The Evolution of Childhood, in THE HISTORY OF
CHILDHOOD 1 (1974) (tracing the evolution of parental child rearing over the past
2000 years or so in the West, and characterizing most of the epoch as replete with
what would be viewed as child abuse by today's standards, with a more empathetic
view of children and a more active role of fathers in child rearing emerging only in
the past 300 years); EVELYN REED, WOMAN's EVOLUTION 81-95, 133-43, 337-38, 393-
432 (1974) (tracing the evolution of the family from the matriarchal clan system
prevalent among hunter-gatherers, which consisted of the physical separation of
adult females and males, and the raising of children in the female sector by
mothers with the assistance of their brothers as tutors of their male children but
with fathers playing no role, to the matrilineal family emerging with settlement
and food production and consisting of the retention of much of the clan structure
but with fathers assisting in child rearing, to the full-fledged patriarchal one-father
and male-dominated family in place by the beginning of the modern era about
3000 years ago); EDWARD 0. WILSoN, ON HUMAN NATURE 141-42, 145 (1978) (dis-
cussing "the human disposition to assemble into families" as far back as hunter-
gatherer societies, and stating "[t]he family, defined broadly as a set of closely
related adults with their children, remains one of the universals of human
organization").
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democratic principles do require the parental right to rear their own chil-
dren, subject, however, to society's right to intervene in order to protect
children's right to comparable educational opportunities. 20 Because pa-
rental rights and children's rights may at times conflict, the task for demo-
cratic theory and practice is to achieve an appropriate balance between
them. However, the contestability of the appropriate balance suggests that
more than one arrangement may comport with democratic principles.
B. The Libertarian Challenge to Public Provision of Education
Assuming a society where parents have primary responsibility for rais-
ing children, possible ways of educating children include total public pro-
vision, total private provision, or some combination of the two.2 1 Before
discussing various alternatives, let's first address claims that the public pro-
vision of children's education violates democratic principles, in which case
total privatization would be the only permissible alternative. The strongest
challenge is the libertarian contention, arguably deriving from the inher-
ently equal moral worth of all, that taxing people to pay for the education
of other people's children constitutes forced sharing in violation of peo-
ple's individual right to be free to pursue their own destinies without inter-
ference by others, including society at large, as long as they respect others'
comparable right.22 From this perspective, people's participation in col-
20. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing the Amish on
Free Exercise grounds to remove their children from public school after the
eighth grade in order to raise them in the Amish way of life, while clearly implying
that religious beliefs requiring children to remain illiterate would not override
compulsory education laws); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)
(holding that while parents have a constitutional right to place their children in
private schools, the state may require parents to educate their children and may
regulate private schools to the extent needed to ensure that children receive an
adequate education).
21. My view of the public-private distinction is that it operates on a contin-
uum, that any departure from total public or private provision makes an enterprise
partially both, and that most enterprises have both public and private features.
Thus, if students in public schools can select their own courses, then the system is
to that degree private. And if the government regulates the curriculum of private
schools, then they are to that extent public. Consequently, a formally public
school system and a system of formally private schools could function identically in
practice through privatizing aspects of the former and publicizing aspects of the
latter.
22. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 1, §§ 4-6 ("To understand political power right,
and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally
in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of
their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. A state
also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having
more than another. . . . The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which
obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but
consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in
his life, health, liberty, or possessions."); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA ix (1974) ("Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or
group may do to them (without violating their rights). . . . Our main conclusions
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lective ventures must be voluntary only, and society's insistence that they
participate against their will is a form of exploitation. Viewing society as a
social compact among inherently equal people, the contention is that peo-
ple would not insist on equitable sharing as a foundational principle but
on a principle of individual self-determination that bans forced sharing.
Viewing people as embedded in pre-existing societies, the contention is
that what necessarily flows from adherence to the principle of inherent
equality is not equitable sharing but rather self-determination without
forced sharing.
An extended discussion of these competing views of the implications
of a commitment to the inherent moral worth of all is beyond the scope of
this Article. Briefly, I think that self-determination without forced sharing
fails because it unjustifiably privileges those who are fortuitously born with
superior capacities, unjustly dooms those who are incapable of taking care
of themselves if others choose not to aid them, and impedes collective
action due to irresolvable free rider problems that enable people to bene-
fit from public goods they really want without having to pay for them.2 3
The weakness of self-determination without forced sharing is espe-
cially glaring as regards children, who themselves have the inherent right
of self-determination. Because children are not fully capable of self-deter-
mination, someone must care for them and prepare them for self-determi-
nation until they are capable. A ban on forced sharing should place the
responsibility, at least initially, on those who choose to bring children into
being. In order to protect children's right of self-determination, and to
deter people who choose to have children from imposing on others, soci-
ety as a whole should be entitled to compel the unwilling to fulfill their
responsibility as parents. But what if some parents are unable to comply
and no one volunteers? If at this point society as a whole is not obligated
to step into the breach, the result is the moral monstrosity of children
unable to care for themselves being left to flounder or die. And if society
is so obligated, it should have the right to require that everyone contrib-
about the state are that a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protec-
tion against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified;
that any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do
certain things, and is unjustified.... [T]he state may not use its coercive apparatus
for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others.").
23. See, e.g., Craig Duncan, The Errors of Libertarianism, in LIBERTARIANIsM: FOR
AND AGAINST 45, 50-54, 59-61 (C. Duncan & T.R. Machan eds., 2005) (contending
that libertarianism fails to adequately protect human dignity in tolerating the ex-
ploitation of the less powerful by the more powerful and impedes collective action
through the incentive to free-ride); Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why Lib-
ertarianism Is Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 133, 138 (2001) ("So we
arrive at the peculiar possibility: The world and all within it can be someone's (or
more likely some class's) property, with all but one (person or group) devoid of
freedom and independence-and yet all is right and just since libertarian proce-
dures and side-constraints have been satisfied.. . . Libertarianism has no place for
government to enforce the provision of public goods, those goods not adequately
and effectively provided for by markets.").
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ute, i.e., to engage in forced sharing, so as to prevent those who would not
voluntarily contribute from forcing on others their share of the cost of
society's obligation. In short, a society based on individual self-determina-
tion may require forced sharing for the provision of obligatory collective
goods, one of which relates to children's education.
Now of what does the parental responsibility toward children consist
regarding their education in a society based on individual self-determina-
tion and parental rights? To leave children uneducated would not suffice
today, since they would not be prepared for self-determination as adults.
Society, then, should have the right to compel parents to provide for their
children's education. But what level of education? My answer, given
equal moral worth and children's right of self-determination, is that soci-
ety could and should mandate a comparable educational opportunity for
all children. If some parents are unable to comply, or if generally priva-
tized education fails to ensure comparable educational opportunity, then
society must publicly provide for children's education to the extent neces-
sary to promote comparable opportunity but without overly impinging on
parental rights. And society may require that everyone contribute to the
public provision of education in order to fulfill its obligation and prevent
free riders. In short, when it comes to children's education in a society
based on self-determination without forced sharing, we end up with what
equitable sharing would require by another route.
C. Private Versus Public Provision of Education:
Five Alternatives
Now let's consider five alternatives for providing for children's educa-
tion, all of which entail compromises between parental and governmental
responsibility for children's right to comparable educational opportunity.
Under all the alternatives education is compulsory (and at least to that
extent public), so as to ensure that children actually receive the education
to which they are entitled. The alternatives are ordered from most to least
governmental responsibility, such that as governmental responsibility de-
creases parental responsibility increases, and vice versa.
The alternatives are: (1) the government provides a free education,
i.e., an education paid for through taxation, to all children in a govern-
ment-run public school system that all are required to attend; (2) the gov-
ernment provides a free education as in (1), except that parents may opt
out of the government-run system and educate their children at their own
expense in private schools or at home; (3) the government furnishes par-
ents with vouchers that can be used toward tuition at a publicly or privately
run school of their choice or to defray the cost of educating their children
themselves; (4) education is generally privatized, meaning that parents
must pay for it out of their pockets, but the government subsidizes the
education of children whose parents cannot afford it; and (5) education is
totally privatized, meaning that parents must provide for their children's
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education with no government involvement whatsoever other than the re-
quirement to educate them.
1. (1) Government-Run Public Schools Versus (5) Total Privatization
Let's first contrast alternatives (1) and (5), i.e., free compulsory edu-
cation in a government-run system versus totally privatized but still com-
pulsory education. In a relatively egalitarian society without substantial
differences among people's wealth, education, and political power,
whether total privatization or a government-run system would fare better
in promoting comparable educational opportunity seems an open ques-
tion, dependent on whether under egalitarian conditions the marketplace
or the political process would be more attentive to children's educational
needs. Either way, the consequences might be similar. The same people
might be drawn to the teaching profession. With total privatization most
parents would likely choose private schools of some type, and the quality
and diversity of these schools might be similar to what a government-run
system would offer. A government-run system could replicate the parental
choice feature of privatization by allowing parents to select the public
schools their children attend. Because all parents would have relatively
equal ability to pay, either as consumers with total privatization or as tax-
payers with governmental provision, comparable money might be spent
on education and the money might be allocated relatively evenly among
all students.
With governmental provision taxpayers without children would pick
up part of the tab, and taxpayers with children might be inclined to push
for public school expenditures beyond what they would be willing to pay
for as consumers for privatized education. But that tendency might be
counterbalanced by the reluctance of those without children to pay for a
public service from which they do not benefit as much as those with chil-
dren. With total privatization the education paid for by consumers with
children would also benefit those without children, and some might be
inclined to spend less than what the public as a whole would be willing to
spend with governmental provision. But that tendency might be offset by
an inclination of others to spend more on privatized education while their
children are in school, due to the fact that they would have no educational
expenses thereafter.
The one respect in which a privatized system might seem less likely to
promote comparable educational opportunity in a relatively egalitarian so-
ciety is that parents with more children or with children having special
needs may not be able to afford an education comparable to what parents
with fewer or less needy children could afford, whereas a government-run
system might be better able to attend to the needs of those children by
spreading the costs among all taxpayers. On the other hand, it may be
that people in an egalitarian society would voluntarily contribute to the
cost of educating children in large families or with special needs because
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they believe the inherent equality of all so requires or that their parents
are shouldering a disproportionate share of society's responsibility to en-
sure comparable educational opportunities for all children. In sum, total
privatization and governmental provision might be quite comparable
under egalitarian conditions.
In an inegalitarian society, on the other hand, total privatization
seems less likely than governmental provision to yield comparable educa-
tional opportunity. With total privatization the well-off and better edu-
cated parents would be able to afford a higher quality education for their
children than the less well-off and less well-educated, and would be better
able to supplement their children's education when not in school. Some
parents might be unable to afford to educate their children at all and
might be incapable of self-education, thereby making compulsory educa-
tion impossible to achieve. Under those conditions, a government-run sys-
tem would likely yield greater comparability than total privatization by
forcing the well-off to subsidize the education of the less well-off through
taxation. A government-run system would not, however, guarantee total
comparability. The advantages of being born into and raised by a well-
educated and well-to-do family, and the disadvantages of being born into
and raised by a poorly educated and less well-off family, probably cannot
be overcome in all instances no matter how children are educated. 24
Since wealth inequalities generally translate into unequal political power,
the well-off in an inegalitarian society would likely try to use their power, if
they could not block a government-run system entirely, to bring about a
system with built-in inequalities favorable to them. On the other hand, the
less well-off might be able, through their greater numbers and if well or-
ganized, to counter the political power of the well-off and institute a gov-
ernment-run system providing, if not full comparability, at least
substantially greater equality of educational opportunity than total
privatization.
2. (5) Total Privatization Versus (4) Government Subsidization
Now let's contrast alternatives (5), total privatization, and (4), govern-
ment subsidization of the education of children whose families cannot af-
ford privatized education on their own. Subsidization would make
compulsory education achievable under a generally privatized system, and
24. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE
CLAss SCHooLs THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 82-84 (2001) (citing and discuss-
ing studies showing that among family influence, the economic status of one's
classmates, and per pupil expenditures, the latter matters least in determining stu-
dent achievement); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING SOCIAL, EcO-
NOMIC, AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 5,
9 (2004) (arguing that while educational reform can contribute to improved per-
formance, student achievement is significantly impacted by social class characteris-
tics whose influence "is probably so powerful that schools cannot overcome it," and
suggesting "the greater importance of reforming social and economic institutions
if we truly want children to emerge from school with equal potential").
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would ameliorate somewhat the hierarchical educational system likely in
an inegalitarian society with total privatization.2 5 But it would likely still
leave a hierarchical system in place. Given the importance of education,
everyone's incentive would be to provide their children with the best edu-
cation they could afford. The likely result would be a tiered system of
schools of varying quality and cost geared to people's means, with the well-
to-do purchasing the highest quality education for their children and so
on down the class hierarchy. The subsidies for those unable to afford it
would likely enable them to purchase only the lowest quality education,
since people paying for their own children's education would not likely be
willing to enable the least well-off to provide more for their children.
3. (1) Government-Run Public Schools Versus (2) The Right to Opt Out
Now let's contrast alternatives (1), free compulsory education in a
government-run system, and (2), a government-run system but with par-
ents having the right to opt out and educate their children at their own
expense. Arguable justifications for allowing opting out are that parents
are entitled to guide their children's destinies until adulthood as long as
they attend to their children's educational needs, that opting out enables
parents more in touch with their children's needs than governmental offi-
cials to choose a more suitable setting from what the public schools pro-
vide, and that the ability to opt out encourages public school authorities to
be more responsive to the needs of all children.2 6
However, there are possible disadvantages to opting out. One is that
parents may focus on their own needs more than on their children's, or
may err in assessing their children's needs. In a society with parental child
rearing and public schooling, conflicts will likely occur between what par-
ents believe is best for their children and the views of public officials who
also bear responsibility for children's education and whose own needs, as
25. Note the resemblance to food stamps. Only those deemed too poor to
afford food receive food stamps, whereas everyone else must provide for them-
selves; food stamps are supposed to assure people a minimally adequate diet, while
others who choose to spend their money on a more elaborate diet are free to do
so. A full discussion of whether this arrangement satisfies the requirement of equi-
table sharing is beyond the scope of this Article. Briefly, equitable sharing cer-
tainly requires that everyone have access to a healthy diet in a society with enough
food to go around. Beyond that, inequalities may be permissible on grounds of
merit or encouraging productivity, as long as society accords everyone a compara-
ble opportunity to attain a more elaborate diet. However, education at the ele-
mentary and secondary level differs from food in that unequal educational
opportunity translates into unequal opportunity generally, such that children who
have access to a superior education have an unfair advantage over those who don't
in pursing success in life, whereas access to an elaborate diet does not necessarily
(if at all) confer a similar advantage. Merit or encouraging productivity may justify
inequalities resulting from how adults choose to use the education they receive as
children, but only when children have comparable educational opportunities.
26. For a discussion of Supreme Court precedent protecting and limiting par-
ents' right to control children's education, see supra note 20.
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with parents, may affect their decisions. In the abstract it seems impossible
to say which of many possible approaches-requiring all children to at-
tend public school, giving parents absolute discretion to opt out of public
school, an administrative process in which one or the other side has the
burden of proof, or governmental regulation of non-public education-is
best suited to attending to children's needs.
A second possible disadvantage is that opting out may undermine the
democracy-enhancing and socializing purposes of formalized education.
In opting out of public schools parents may focus more on their children's
needs than on the needs of society as a whole. Parents may put more
emphasis, when the two differ, on the skills and knowledge their children
need to prosper as adults than on the knowledge needed to understand
and participate effectively in the democratic process. Or parents may opt
for home education, thereby arguably depriving society of the benefits in
promoting social harmony of children's interacting with others outside
their families and immediate environment. Again, it seems impossible to
say in the abstract whether such consequences would flow from opting
out. To the extent they do, government intervention may ameliorate the
effects: for example, through regulating the curriculum at private or
home schools, or encouraging or requiring home schooled children to
participate in extracurricular activities provided for free by the
government.
Third, a disadvantage particularly applicable in inegalitarian settings
is that the well-off may educate their children privately so as to provide
them with a better education than what the public schools offer, thereby
undermining the democratic requirement of comparable educational op-
portunity for all. If those who opt out must still pay taxes to support pub-
lic schools, the option will likely be available only or primarily to the well-
off. A conceivable scenario is a dual system of schooling: higher quality
privatized education for and paid for by the well-off, and lower quality
public education for the less well-off paid for by taxpayers for many of
whom, i.e., the well-off with children educated privately, the incentive
would be to minimize the taxes they pay for a service they do not receive.
Relieving those who opt out from having to pay school taxes would extend
the option more broadly, although it would likely remain unavailable to
the least well-off who pay minimal taxes. The consequence might be a
hierarchical system of private schools of varying quality depending on abil-
ity to pay and of low quality public schools serving only the least well-off.27
27. Something comparable is occurring in India. See Somini Sengupta, Push
for Education Yields Little for India's Poor, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/17/world/asia/I 7india.html?-r=1&scp=6&sq-
somini§engupta&st=nyt (noting that most Indian families of means send their chil-
dren to private schools, while public schools have sunk to spectacularly low quality
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4. (3) Government-Funded Vouchers
Finally, let's address alternative (3), a government-funded voucher
system.28 Under egalitarian conditions, a voucher system might yield sub-
stantially comparable educational opportunity similar to at least some ver-
sions of either a government-run or privatized system. The value of the
voucher would likely resemble what people pay in taxes under a govern-
ment-run system or out of their pockets under total privatization. If a gov-
ernment-run system not allowing opting out or allowing opting out with
relief from school taxes were to shift to a voucher system, parents might
use their vouchers at public or private schools similar to what their chil-
dren were previously attending or to defray their prior expenditures on
home education.2 9 Likewise, if a totally privatized system were to shift to
vouchers, parents might use the voucher to cover the costs of similar for-
malized or home education as before.
Under inegalitarian conditions, whether a voucher system would pro-
mote comparable educational opportunity depends on its design. As
against a privatized system with or without government subsidization for
those unable to educate their children, vouchers might ameliorate the hi-
erarchical system likely to result from some being able to spend more than
others on their children's education or from some being unable to edu-
cate their children at all. As against a public school system without opting
out, vouchers might enable parents who are more attentive than school
authorities to their children's needs to choose to educate them privately
or at a public school other than the one to which they have been assigned.
As against a public school system with opting out, and with or without
relief from property taxes, vouchers might enable parents unable to afford
it to opt out.
However, if the recipients of vouchers were entitled to spend more
for their children's education than the amount of the voucher, then the
28. For a history and evaluation of the voucher movement, see generally
BIuAN GILL ET AL., RHETORIC VERSUS REALiTy WHAT WE KNOw AND WHAT WE NEED
To KNow ABour VOUCHERS AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 1-68 (2007); THOMAs L. GOOD
& JENNIFER S. BRADEN, THE GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE: CHOICE, VOUCHERS, AND CHAR-
TERS 86-113 (2000). A possible alternative to vouchers as a way to enhance paren-
tal choice is charter schools. Charter schools are government-funded schools
subject to less state control of their operations than ordinarily applicable to public
schools. Some charter schools are formed by local public school authorities, in
which case they resemble magnet or other special purpose schools. Others are
created by private entities, in which case they resemble private schools except that
attendees don't pay tuition. Other than the method of payment, vouchers and
charter schools could be designed to function identically. For a history and evalua-
tion of the charter school movement, see generally GILL ET AL., supra; GOOD &
BRADEN, supra, at 114-36; Caroline M. Hoxby, The Supply of Charter Schools, in CHAR-
TER SCHOOLS AGAINST THE ODDS 1 (P. Hill ed., 2006).
29. On the other hand, as compared with a government-run system with opt-
ing out but no relief from school taxes, vouchers would likely enhance the ability
of those who prefer private schooling but remain in public school due to unwill-
ingness to bear the additional expense.
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well-off might do so in order to gain an advantage for their children. The
incentive of the well-off would be to keep the amount of the voucher as
low as possible, so as to minimize their subsidization of the less well-off and
maximize their financial advantage. The result might be a system that is at
best somewhat less hierarchical, but possibly more so, than with a totally
privatized or government-run system.3 0 To avoid this result, it may be nec-
essary to prohibit schools that accept vouchers from charging more than
the voucher or from favoring the well-off in their admissions process. 3 '
Even so, hierarchy is likely to result, with the well-off being better able
than the less well-off to supplement their children's education, and with
some who can afford it declining to use their vouchers and sending their
children to expensive schools not accepting vouchers and catering to the
well-off.
In sum, while under egalitarian conditions a privatized, government-
run, or voucher system might all produce a relatively comparable educa-
30. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Voice Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 302-08
(1991) (book review) (opposing vouchers and other school choice plans facilitat-
ing exit from the public school system for their likely contribution to a hierarchical
and inegalitarian educational system, and recommending consideration of
mandatory public school attendance as a way to bring about ethnic and class inte-
gration); James A. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111
YALE L.J. 2043, 2047-48 (2002) (arguing that "unless the politics surrounding
school choice are altered, school choice plans will continue to be structured in
ways that protect the physical and financial independence of suburban public
schools ... [and] will lead to, at best, limited academic improvement, [and] little
or no gain in racial and socio-economic integration"). Others have a more positive
view of the potential benefits of vouchers. SeeJames Forman, Jr., The Rise and Fall
of School Vouchers: A Story of Religion, Race, and Politics, 84 UCLA L. REv. 547, 579-84
(2007) (noting the uncertainty to date of the educational impact of voucher pro-
grams on minority students who receive them and those who remain in public
schools, and suggesting that vouchers are a worthwhile experiment along with ef-
forts to promote socio-economic integration of suburban schools).
31. Because charter schools receive their funding directly from the govern-
ment, charging more to those who can afford more is less of a problem with such
schools, although they may still have an incentive to favor high achievers in order
to enhance their reputations. On the potential benefits of charter schools, see, for
example, CHARTER SCHOOLs AGAINST THE ODDS, supra note 28, at 127-203 (contain-
ing articles on the potential benefits of charter schools); THE EMANCIPATORY PROM-
ISE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS (Eric Rofes & Lisa M. Stulberg eds., 2004) (providing a
series of essays arguing that community-controlled charter schools geared to the
needs of low-income students and students of color offer an emancipatory poten-
tial for the disadvantaged and disenfranchised); James Forman, Jr., Do Charter
Schools Threaten Public Education? Evidence from Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for
Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 839 (arguing that the existing data suggests that
charter schools do not threaten public education, that in general charter schools
have not "cream skimmed" whites and economically well-off students from public
schools, and that rather than undermining support for public school funding char-
ter schools might become allies with public schools in the pursuit of increased
government expenditures for education; on the other hand, noting the need for
regulation to prevent charter schools from engaging in selective admissions prac-
tices, the uncertainty of whether charter schools skim students of higher academic
ability or from well educated families, and the possibility that the current focus on
standardized testing might impel charter schools to cream skim).
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tional opportunity for all children, none are likely to do so under inegal-
itarian conditions, although an appropriately designed government-run or
voucher system would likely be more nearly comparable than total priva-
tization. This sets the stage to discuss the federalization of education.
IV. FEDERALIZATION AND COMPARABLE EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
By federal provision I mean provision by the highest level of govern-
ment in the society, i.e., the national government. Must the national gov-
ernment itself be the provider, or may the responsibility be assigned to
lower levels of government? The answer is that public provision may be
assigned to lower levels only if the requirement of comparable educational
opportunity for all children is satisfied. If not, then the national govern-
ment must be the provider, at least to the extent necessary to ensure
comparability.
Let's consider three models for allocating the responsibility to pro-
vide for education between the national and lower level governments: (1)
total lower level provision with no national involvement and each lower
level provider being totally responsible for its locale; (2) total national pro-
vision with lower levels of government having no role at all; and (3) a
mixed allocation with the national government assuming some educa-
tional responsibilities and lower level governments assuming others.
In the prior section, we found that under egalitarian conditions both
public and private provision of education might yield comparable educa-
tional opportunities for all children, and that in practice the various ap-
proaches might operate identically. Consequently, in a society without
substantial differences among people's wealth, education, and political
power, both national and lower level provision of education may comport
with democratic principles. Thus, for example, a federal system of govern-
ment-run public schools that all must attend might suffice; so might provi-
sion by lower levels of government, with some having public schools,
others total privatization, and still others a voucher system. On the other
hand, there may be reasons to favor some approaches over others. For
example, that all have comparable wealth, education, and political power
does not necessarily mean that everyone's educational needs are identical,
and it might be that lower level governments are better able than the na-
tional government to identify their children's needs. Or if education is to
be publicly financed, it may be more efficient for the national government
to tax and distribute funds to lower level governments than for those gov-
ernments to raise their own funds. Because it is difficult to answer such
questions in the abstract, experimentation would likely be needed.
Under inegalitarian conditions, the case for federalizing at least some
aspects of education in order to promote comparable opportunity be-
comes stronger. We found above that under inegalitarian conditions
some form of public provision is required. At a minimum, then, if educa-
tion is to be decentralized, the national government must prohibit lower
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level governments from totally privatizing education within their jurisdic-
tions and must ensure through appropriate regulation that they publicly
provide for comparable educational opportunity for their children. This
might be enough if lower level governments were comparably inegal-
itarian as compared with each other. But if not, then the national govern-
ment must assume a greater role. If there are significant wealth disparities
among lower level governments, the national government must somehow
ensure fiscal equality.
One approach would be for the national government to raise funds
for education nationally and to distribute the money to lower level govern-
ments, so as to equalize the quality of education across the localities. This
approach, however, would not likely produce comparability if lower level
governments were free to supplement their federal funds with local reve-
nues, as well-off communities would have the incentive and would be able
to provide their children with a higher quality education than less well-off
communities could afford. The national government might try to prevent
that by prohibiting lower level governments from imposing supplementary
taxes, but people in localities that are better off might counteract that
move through voluntary contributions to local schools. To avoid, or at
least minimize, escape hatches, the national government might have to
federalize education still more, as by abolishing lower level provision of
education and establishing a national public school system. While well-off
parents would still be able to enhance their children's education by opting
out of public school if allowed or by supplementing their education
outside of school, total or substantial federalization seems the most viable
way to minimize educational inequalities under inegalitarian conditions
with diverse lower level governments.
V. FEDERALIZING EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Inequality of Educational Opportunity in the United States
The United States is a highly inegalitarian society.3 2 If education
were totally privatized the consequence would likely be a highly stratified
32. As of the early 2000s, the top 1% of households had about 33% of the
total net worth and about 20% of the total income, the top 20% of households had
84% of the total net worth and about 59% of the total income, while the bottom
40% had less than 1% of the net worth and only about ten 10% of the income. See
Edward N. Wolff, Changes in Household Wealth in the 1980s and 1990s in the US. 30
tbl.2 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard College, Working Paper No. 407, 2004), available at
http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp/407.pdf (presenting statistics on the distribution of
wealth and income between 1983 and 2001). These disparities have grown since
the 1960s, and are at their highest level since before the Great Depression. See id.
(showing increasing disparities over the years); see also LISA A. KEISTER, WEALTH IN
AMERICA 58 tbl.3-2 (2000) (presenting statistics on net worth and wealth between
1962 and 1995); Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in the Distribution of Household
Wealth, in BACK TO SHARED PROSPERrlY: THE GROWING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH AND
INCOME IN AMERICA 57, 59-60 (Ray Marshall ed., 2000) (presenting statistics on
wealth and income from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Trends). In addition, as of
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system with a relatively small economic elite purchasing a relatively high
quality education to prepare themselves and their children for the higher
paying professions for which such an education is essential, with a large
working class purchasing vocational education or obtaining on-the-job
training to prepare themselves for lower paying manual, clerical, or service
jobs requiring only a minimal or modest education, and with a rather siza-
ble underclass of illiterate or barely literate people who work, at best, spo-
radically at manualjobs not requiring much, if any, education and who are
mired in poverty. This would violate the principle of equitable sharing-
particularly with regard to children of elementary and secondary school
age. A commitment to the equal moral worth of all does not permit the
quality of education children receive to depend on the class status of the
families into which they are fortuitously born.
While governmental provision of elementary and secondary educa-
tion is the norm in this country, and while most children attend public
schools, educational opportunities are nevertheless highly unequal and
these inequalities contribute to an increasingly rigid social hierarchy. 3
the early 2000s, the mean net worth of black families was only 14% of white fami-
lies, while the mean family income of African Americans was only 48% of whites.
See Wolff, Changes in Household Wealth, supra, at 35 tbl.7. Hispanics faced compara-
ble disparities, with family net worth of only 17% and family income of only 50% of
whites. See id. at 36 tbl.8. At the bottom of the class hierarchy a substantial seg-
ment of the population, among whom African Americans and Hispanics are dis-
proportionately represented, lives in poverty. As of 2005, almost 13% of the
population fell below the official poverty line; for non-Hispanic whites, the poverty
rate was about 8%, for African Americans about 25%, and for Hispanics about
22%. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 46 tbl.B-1
(2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf (showing
poverty status of people by family relationship, race, and Hispanic origin). After
falling substantially from more than 22% in 1959 to about 12% in 1972, the pov-
erty rate has leveled off over the past thirty years. See id. (noting that in 2005 the
poverty rate was at 12.6%).
33. While analysts disagree over the extent of intra and intergenerational mo-
bility, there are indications that the ability to climb the class hierarchy has dimin-
ished over time and that economic inequality has become increasingly entrenched.
See, e.g., KEISTER, supra note 32, at 79 tbls.3-7, 233-58 (concluding, per simulation
modeling between 1975 and 1995, that the importance of education for upward
mobility has increased over time, that college graduates have considerably higher
odds of upward mobility, and that the odds of moving into the top 10% have been
substantially greater for whites than non-whites); Eileen Appelbaum et al., Low-
Wage America: An Overview, in Low-WAGE AMERICA: How EMPLOYERS ARE RESHAPING
OPPORTUNITY IN THE WORKPLACE 1-29 (Eileen Appelbaum et al. eds., 2003)
(presenting a series of studies analyzing the increasing inequality and decreasing
mobility in the United States due to globalization, technology, deregulation,
changes in financial markets, and the decline in labor unions); Julia B. Isaacs,
Economic Mobility of Black and White Families, in GETrING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND:
ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 71, 77 (Julia B. Isaacs et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.economicmobility.org/assets/pdfs/PEW EMPGETTINGAHEAD_
FULL.pdf (finding that "white children have substantially more upward mobility
than black children of comparable incomes");Julia B. Isaacs, Economic Mobility of
Families Across Generations, in GETrING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC
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One factor contributing to unequal educational opportunity is the private
school option. As a result of Pierce v. Society of Sisters,3 4 parents are constitu-
tionally entitled to place their children in private school.3 5 About thirteen
percent of students attend private school,3 6 with the option being more
readily available to the well-off who can afford the tuition, and this seem-
ingly contributes to class and racial separation.3 7 Although there is some
debate whether private schools enhance educational performance,3 8 par-
MoBILrY IN AMERICA, supra, at 15, 19 (concluding, based on comparison of chil-
dren's incomes between 1995 and 2005 with parents' incomes between 1967 and
1971, that "[a]ll Americans do not have an equal shot at getting ahead, and one's
chances are largely dependent on one's parents' economic position"); Daniel P.
McMurrer & Isabel V. Sawhill, The Effects of Economic Growth and Inequality on Oppor-
tunity, in BACK TO SHARED PROSPERITY: THE GROWING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH AND
INCOME IN AMERICA 64 (Ray Marshall ed., 2000) (concluding that, while there is
"considerable" intra and intergenerational mobility in the U.S., "[t]he period since
the early 1970s has been marked by a decline in opportunity for many, especially
young men without college degrees").
34. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
35. See id. at 536 (protecting parents' right to educate children outside of
public schools subject to reasonable state regulation).
36. As of 2005, 12.8% of all students attended private schools. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, ENROLLMENT BELOW COLLEGE FOR PEOPLE 3-24 YEARs OLD, BY CONTROL OF
SCHOOL, SEX, METROPOLITAN STATUS, RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN: OCTOBER 2005, at
tbls.5-1 & 5-3 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/
socdemo/school/cps2005.html. In addition, about 2.2% of all students are
homeschooled. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INST. OF EDUC. ScIs., U.S.
DEP'T OF Eouc., HOMESCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at tbl.2 (2006),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/homeschool/TableDisplay.asp?Table
Path=TablesHTML/table_2.asp.
37. See, e.g., CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER Brown: The Rise and Retreat of
School Desegregation 123, 100-25 (2004) (finding that "private schools do appear
to have contributed to racial segregation in K-12 schools, though their contribu-
tion is significantly less than that attributable to racial disparities among school
districts"); Robert W. Fairlie, Racial Segregation and the Private/Public School Choice,
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ., New York, N.Y.), Feb.
2006, available at http://www.ncspe.org/publications-files/OP124.pdf (finding
that blacks and Hispanics are substantially underrepresented in private schools,
that whites and Hispanics enroll in private school in response to high concentra-
tions of black students in public schools, and that family income is directly related
to and a major determinant of who attends private school); Eric J. Isenberg, The
Choice of Public, Private, or Home Schooling 14-19 (2006), available at http://client.
norc.org/jole/SOLEweb/7338.pdf (finding that the poor quality of public schools
is a significant factor motivating parents to choose private schools especially for the
well educated, and that families living inside metropolitan areas and in locales with
greater income heterogeneity are more likely to choose private schools).
38. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INST. OF EDUc. Scis., U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC., COMPARING PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS USING HIERARCHICAL
LINEAR MODELING (2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/
studies/2006461.pdf (concluding, based on 2003 National Assessment of Educa-
tional Progress exams in math and reading for fourth and eighth grades and after
adjusting for student and school characteristics, that private and public school stu-
dents performed comparably in math at the eighth grade level and reading at the
fourth grade level areas, that private schoolers outperformed public schoolers in
reading at the eighth grade level, and that public schoolers outperformed private
schoolers in math at the fourth grade level); Paul E. Peterson & Elena Llaudet, On
3912010]
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ents opting for private schools evidently believe they are more suited to
their children's needs and the more prestigious universities disproportion-
ately admit graduates of the elite private schools.39
A second, and greater, factor contributing to unequal educational op-
portunity is the structure of public education. The primary responsibility
for providing education rests with state and local governments. 40 Most
state constitutions obligate the state to have a system of free public
schools, and most states have delegated a large share of the responsibility
to cities and independent school districts. The rationale is that shared
responsibility serves the dual needs of uniformity and diversity. State regu-
lation and oversight of local school systems ensures instruction from quali-
fied teachers in material that all children should be exposed to, while local
the Public-Private School Achievement Debate (Aug. 2006) (paper prepared for
annual meeting of Am. Political Sci. Ass'n), available at http://
www.hks.harvard.edu/pepg/PDF/Papers/PEPG06-02-PetersonLlaudet.pdf (con-
cluding that NCES study was methodologically flawed and that with better mea-
sures of student and school characteristics private school students consistently
outperformed public school students). With regard to voucher and charter
schools, some studies indicate and the prevailing sentiment seems to be that, when
controlled for race and class, the performance of children in voucher and charter
schools does not differ much and may be somewhat lower than that of public
school students. See, e.g., CHARTER SCHOOL OUTCOMES 163-281 (M. Berends et al.
eds., 2008) (providing studies of the impact of charter schools in California, North
Carolina, and Idaho); GILL ET AL., supra note 28, at 79-125 (discussing various stud-
ies on the impact of vouchers and charter schools on the academic achievement of
those attending and on those remaining in traditional public schools); GooD &
BRADEN, supra note 28, at 137-87 (discussing studies of educational achievement in
charter versus traditional public schools); National Center for the Study of Priva-
tization in Education, http://www.ncspe.org/list-papers.php (last visited Apr. 7,2010) (providing a series of studies on the impact of charter and voucher schools).
39. For example, as of 2008, between 24%-45% of the graduates of the fifteen
top-ranked private day schools, and between 15%-34% of the graduates of the fif-
teen top-ranked private boarding schools, attended in the prior five years the Ivy
League, MIT, or Stanford. See PrepReview.com, America's Top College Prepara-
tory Boarding Schools (2009), http://www.prepreview.com/rankings/us/board-
ngschools.php (providing private boarding school rankings); PrepReview.com,
America's Top College Preparatory Private Day Schools (2009), http://
www.prepreview.com/rankings/us/private-schools.php (providing private day
school rankings); see also PETER W. COOKSON, JR. & CAROLINE HODGES PERSELL,
PREPARING FOR POWER: AMERICA'S ELITE BOARDING SCHOOLs 167-89, 171, 184-85(1985) (discussing the historic connection between the elite private schools and
the Ivy League and other elite colleges and universities; noting that about 20% of
boarding school students attend the Ivy League and that as late as 1982 34% of
Harvard freshmen and 40% at Yale and Princeton were private school graduates;
and noting that public school students with similar credentials and backgrounds as
prep school students are accepted at less selective institutions).
40. See, e.g., ROBERT J. FRANCIOSI, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOoLS 143-67 (2004) (describing public education in the United States as pri-
marily local in character at its inception, the push for state centralization in the
first hundred years, and the increased level of state and federal involvement since
the mid-twentieth century); JOHN D. PULUIAM & JAMES J. VAN PATTEN, HISTORY OF
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control through locally elected officials makes school authorities more ac-
cessible and ensures greater responsiveness to the diversity of needs and
interests among students and locales. This arrangement has arguable
merit in promoting comparable educational opportunities for all
children. 41
However, state and local governments also share the primary respon-
sibility for funding education. Nationwide about ninety percent of public
schools' finances come from state and local governments, with the state
and local shares being roughly equal, although varying somewhat from
state to state. 42 State and local financing produces substantial inequalities
in per pupil educational expenditures. Because local governments' tax
bases differ widely within states, so does their ability to raise money to fund
education. As a result, the richer school districts in which well-off children
tend to live generally spend more money on education and provide a
higher quality education than the poorer districts where the less well-off
live. 43 Similar inequalities exist among the states. Per pupil expenditures
differ substantially among them, and in general the more well-off states
provide a higher quality education than the less well-off.44 In the inegal-
41. See, e.g., GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 73-74 (advocating shared educational
responsibility among levels of government as a means "to preserve local demo-
cratic control over schools within limits set by the aims of cultivating a common
culture and teaching essential democratic values, limits that might be better safe-
guarded by higher levels of government").
42. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUc. STATISTICS, INST. OF EDUC. Scis., U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUc., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICs, at tbls.171 & 172 (2008), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/dt08_l71.asp (tbl.171) (provid-
ing data on source of funds for public schools), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/
digest/d08/tables/dt08 172.asp (tbl.172) (same).
43. See, e.g., CARMEN G. ARROYO, THE FUNDING GAP 6-7 tbls.5 & 6 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.nvasb.org/Publications/Research_Data/the-funding-gap.pdf
(finding that, as of 2005, on average, high-poverty districts received $938 less per
pupil than low-poverty districts and that high-minority districts received $877 less
than low-minority districts); BRUCEJ. BIDDLE & DAVID C. BERLINER, WHAT RESEARCH
SAYS ABOUT UNEQUAL FUNDING FOR SCHOOLS IN AMERICA (2003), available at http:/
/www.wested.org/online-pubs/p-0 3-Ol.pdf (documenting large funding differ-
ences between wealthy and impoverished communities, and attributing the gaps to
the heavy reliance on local property taxes).
44. In 2005-06, the average elementary and secondary school per pupil ex-
penditure in the United States was $9,154, ranging from a high of $14,954 in New
Jersey to a low of $5,464 in Utah. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INST. OF
EDUc. Scis., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, at tbl.184
(2008), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/dt0 8 _184.
asp; see also Richard Rothstein, Equalizing Education Resources on Behalf of Disadvan-
taged Children, in A NOTION AT RISK: PRESERVING PUBLIC EDUCATION As AN ENGINE
FOR SOCIAL MOBILTY 31, 32, 37-63 (R. Kahlenberg ed., 2000) (documenting as of
the late 1990s that poorer states with higher levels of poverty spend less on educa-
tion than richer states with lower levels of poverty, and concluding that differences
in per pupil expenditure between states "are a greater cause of disadvantaged stu-
dents falling behind their counterparts than any other school resource inequality"
and that existing federal aid programs do little to ameliorate and in some in-
stances exacerbate the inequalities, and calling for increased and redirected fed-
eral spending); James P. Pinkerton, A Grand Compromise: Saving American Education
3932010]
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itarian context of the United States, state and local financing of public
education does not comport with the requirement of equitable sharing.4 5
A related structural factor is that due to the demographic differences
among local governments, public education in the United States is signifi-
cantly segregated along class and race lines. 46 A common pattern is a
poorer, predominantly working-class, and disproportionately minority, in-
Requires Ending the Reliance on Public Schools on Local Property-Tax Bases, ATLANTic
MONTHLY,Jan./Feb. 2003, at 115, 115-16 (reporting on a study of National Associa-
tion of Educational Progress test results in thirty states showing that nine of the
eleven states spending more than the national per pupil average had average or
better test results, while twelve of the nineteen states spending less than the na-
tional average had less than average results).
45. But see Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez Revisited: Constitutional Theory and
School Finance, 32 GA. L. REv. 475, 479 (1998) (arguing that a "principle of intrinsic
equality" underlies the Equal Protection Clause and "guarantees all children of
normal intelligence the opportunity to receive an education that prepares them
for the rights and responsibilities of adult citizenship in a democratic society," but
that "as long as all children receive a certain minimum level of educational oppor-
tunity, the fact that some children receive better opportunities does not necessarily
violate the principle of intrinsic equality .. . even if the educational inequalities are
caused by inequalities in the taxable wealth of the local communities in which
these children reside," and that the principle of intrinsic equality is satisfied by
requiring states to provide all children the opportunity to attain a high school level
education). From my perspective, the problem with Foley's approach is that there
is no such thing as a high school level education in the abstract and that what a
high school level education consists of depends on the context. If some receive
education X, then that is their level; if others receive X+Y, then that is their level.
To require in the inegalitarian context of the United States that all children have
access to X, while allowing others who can afford it to receive X+Y, is to institution-
alize differential levels of high school education along class lines, to prepare the
more well-off for the rights and responsibilities of adult citizenship better than the
less well-off, and to advantage the more well-off in achieving success in social life as
adults. This is inconsistent with what Foley calls intrinsic equality and what I call
inherently equal moral worth. Either one, in my view, requires a comparable edu-
cational opportunity for all children.
46. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
HISTORIc REVERSALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTE-
GRATION STRATEGIES (2007) [hereinafter ORFIELD & LEE, INTEGRATION STRATEGIES],
available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/reversals-reseg
need.pdf (documenting the decreasing percentage of whites and the increasing
percentage of poor children in public schools, increasing racial segregation since
the early 1980s following a period of increased integration beginning in the early
1960s, the high incidence of segregation for all racial groups except Asians and
with whites being the most segregated, the confluence of segregation by race and
poverty with the average black and Latino attending a school more than half poor,
and the general inferiority of minority schools); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE
NATURE OF SEGREGATION (2006), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.
edu/research/deseg/Racial Transformation.pdf (documenting between 1991-92
and 2003-04 the increased incidence of minorities attending public schools
predominantly (50% or more) and substantially (90% or more) of their own
ethnicity, as well as the high incidence of segregation by race and poverty com-
bined, while also noting the emergence of substantial numbers of multiracial
schools due to the increasingly minority composition of public school students
overall).
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ner-city school district surrounded by mostly well-off and predominantly
white suburban districts. Inner-city schools generally provide an inferior
education as compared to suburban schools 4 7 and many educators be-
lieve racial and class integration is needed to equalize educational oppor-
tunities. 48 If so, the failure to take reasonably available steps to bring
about greater integration violates the duty to provide comparable educa-
tional opportunity.
Some aspects of today's unequal education could be addressed on the
state level. If states would redraw local school district boundaries to be
more racially and class inclusive, that might reduce performance gaps. If
states would shoulder the full cost of public education, that could redress
the inequalities of the present reliance on local financing. Without fed-
eral financing, however, the inequalities among the states will persist. So
at a minimum federalizing public education seems necessary to address
those educational inequalities, like school financing, that are beyond state
but are within federal control. Federalization might be better suited, as
well, to address some matters within state control for reasons of efficiency
or due to political factors that impede reforms more so at the state than at
the federal level. But with or without federalization, the advantage to the
47. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT
HARVARD UNIV., WHv SEGREGATION MATTERs: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUAL-
riv (2005), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/
WhySegregMatters.pdf (citing data and studies showing a strong relationship be-
tween racial segregation with high concentrations of poverty and educational ine-
qualities in terms of teacher quality, test scores, and drop out rates); John A.
Powell, An "Integrated" Theory of Integrated Education 5-9 (Aug. 30, 2002) (un-
published manuscript, on file with UCLA Civil Rights Project), available at http://
www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/reseg02/powell.pdf (discussing the edu-
cational harms of segregation and concentrated poverty).
48. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE
CLAss SCHOOLs THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 23-37, 116-35 (2001) (citing and
discussing studies showing the educational benefits of socio-economic integration
to all students, advocating a system of "controlled choice" under which parents
select the schools their children will attend and selections are honored so as to
foster integration defined as a school in which a majority of students are middle
class, and opining that through controlled choice most school districts could
achieve integration within existing boundaries); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of
Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 1334 (2004) (arguing, on the basis of studies showing its benefits, that eco-
nomic integration of schools offers the most promising way to achieve Brown's goal
of equal educational opportunity for all children); Russell W. Rumberger & Greg-
ory J. Palardy, Does SegregationStill Matter? The Impact of Student Composition on Aca-
demic Achievement in High School, 107 TCHRS. C. REc. 1999, 2020 (2005), available at
http://education.ucsb.edu/rumberger/internet%20pages/Papers/Rumberger%
20&%2oPalardy-Does%20segregation%20still%20matter% 2 0(TCR%202005).pdf
(concluding, based on analysis of National Education Longitudinal Survey data,
that "all students, whatever their race, social class, or academic background, who
attended high schools with other students from high social class backgrounds
learned more, on average, than students who attended high schools with other
students from low social class backgrounds," and that these results were largely
attributable to higher teacher expectations, greater academic rigor, and feelings of
safety in schools of higher socio-economic status).
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well-off of the right to opt for private schooling, which I assume will con-
tinue due to its perceived centrality to parental child-rearing, will re-
main.4 9 And the educational advantage of being born into a well-off and
well-educated family will likely continue for as long as the society's class
hierarchy and parental child rearing endure.5 0
B. The Inadequacy of the Current Federal Role
Recognizing the inability to assure all children a comparable educa-
tion absent even more fundamental systemic reform than the federaliza-
tion of education, a sketch of the role the federal government currently
plays in the provision of elementary and secondary education is instructive
in assessing what its role should be. The federal involvement began to
increase substantially with the enactment of the Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act of 1965.51 The federal government now provides
about ten percent of the funds for public education in the United States.52
Although most of this money is intended to benefit lower income and
49. Tax credits for private school tuition would equalize somewhat the oppor-
tunity to opt out for parents able to afford it. On the movement for tax credits,
see, for example, ANDREW COULSON, FORGING CONSENSUS: CAN THE SCHOOL
CHOICE COMMUNITY COME TOGETHER ON AN EXPLICIT GOAL AND A PLAN FOR ACHIEV-
ING IT? 69 (2004), available at http://www.mackinac.org/archives/2004/s2o4-
01.pdf (arguing for "an education market driven by the unfettered choices of par-
ents, in which both for-profit and non-profit schools compete freely and vigorously
to attract and retain students" and that "[a] Universal Education Tax Credit pro-
gram is the ideal vehicle for instantiating an effective education market"). How-
ever, the impact of tax credits might be to exacerbate overall educational
inequalities-if, for example, large numbers of better off people take advantage of
tax credits, leaving public schools mostly to those unable to afford private school
tuition and with reduced funding due to the reluctance of private schoolers to
continue to support public schools. Whether the private school option as prac-
ticed today, i.e., with no relief from school taxes, has drained money from public
schools seems not to have been widely studied. One study of New York state school
districts (not including New York City) between 1983-93 concluded that enroll-
ment in private schools does not cause a significant loss in taxpayer support of
public schools. See Don Goldhaber, An Endogenous Model of Public School Expendi-
tures and Private School Enrollment, 46 J. URBAN ECON. 106 (1999) (discussing the
relationship between private school enrollment and per pupil expenditure in pub-
lic schools). Since a relatively small percentage of parents currently opt out of
public schools, they may lack the political power to affect public school funding.
That might change if tax credits enable larger numbers to opt out.
50. See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, supra note 24 (discussing studies showing the influ-
ence of family and the economic status of one's peers on academic achievement);
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 24 (arguing that the impact of social class on academic
achievement can probably not be fully overcome).
51. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006) (providing current statement of legislative
purpose).
52. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INST. OF EDUC. Scis., U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, at tbl.171 (2008), available at http://
nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/dtO8_171.asp (summarizing data on
sources of school funding).
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disadvantaged children,5 3 the effectiveness of the federal effort in improv-
ing and equalizing educational opportunities has been questioned.5 4 In
addition, a series of statutes promote equal educational opportunity in
other respects, including requirements that states and localities receiving
federal money not discriminate on the basis of race, gender, national ori-
gin, or handicapped status, and that they act affirmatively to respond to
the educational needs of those groups.55 While often quibbling about the
details, most commentators believe these measures have contributed sig-
nificantly to the equalization of educational opportunities.5 6 Neverthe-
less, they have left in place the generally inegalitarian system noted above.
53. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INST. OF EDUC. Scis., U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, at tbl.375 (2008), available at http://
nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/dt08_3 7 5.asp (noting that of the $72.8
billion budgeted in 2008 for elementary and secondary education, $55.5 billion
was allocated to five programs benefiting lower income and disadvantaged chil-
dren: Education for the disadvantaged, School improvement, Special education,
Child nutrition, and Head Start); see also CARL L. BANKSTON & STEPHEN J. CALDAS,
PUBLIC EDUCATION-AMERICA'S CIVIL RELIGION: A SOCAL HISTORY 115-22 (2009)
(discussing the adoption in the 1960s as part of the War on Poverty of the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), Project Head Start, and the
Free and Reduced Price federal lunch program); JULIE Roy JEFFREY, EDUCATION
FOR CHILDREN OF THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION Acr OF 1965 (1978) (assessing history of
ESEA's enactment and implementation); Thomas W. Payzant & Jessica Levin, Im-
proving America's Schools for Children in Greatest Need, in NATIONAL ISSUES IN EDUCA-
TION: ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION Acr 55 (J. Jennings ed., 1995)
(discussing the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, which amended ESEA to
support state initiatives to promote high standards for all students while preserving
its emphasis on the poor and disadvantaged).
54. See, e.g., Adam R. Nelson, The Federal Role in American Education: A Histori-
ographical Essay, in RETHINKING THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 261, 272 (W.
Reese & J. Rury eds., 2008) (concluding, based on a survey of the literature, that
"the impression persists that large-scale grants-in-aid have not dramatically im-
proved the quality (or the equality) of the nation's schools"); Rothstein, supra note
44 (arguing as of the late 1990s that federal aid programs do little to ameliorate
and in some instances exacerbate educational inequalities).
55. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on
race or national origin in federally funded programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d).
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimination based on
sex in educational programs receiving federal funds. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination in federally funded
programs against an "otherwise qualified individual . .. solely by reason of her or
his disability." 29 U.S.C. § 794. The Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974
requires "appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal par-
ticipation" in educational programs. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f). The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (now titled the Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act) requires "free appropriate education" and "full educational oppor-
tunity" for children with disabilities and an "individualized education program"
geared to the "unique needs" of each child. Id. §§ 1412(1), 1412(2), 1414(d).
56. See, e.g., Robert A. Garda, Jr., Untangling Eligibility Requirements Under the
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 69 Mo. L. REv. 441, 443, 450-51 (2004)
(noting that "for most children eligibility means the difference between receiving
essential 'special education and related services' at public expense or nothing at
all," while arguing that eligibility criteria have not been adequately delineated,
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The most recent federal intervention in education is the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). 5 7 NCLB represents the federal govern-
ment's most intensive effort to date to impact the overall quality of educa-
tion.5 8 Its stated goal is to ensure that all students achieve proficiency in
the core academic skills of reading and mathematics.5 9 Toward that end,
states receiving federal money must adopt proficiency standards to be
achieved by 2014, and must demonstrate through standardized testing an-
nual progress in meeting those standards, and in particular, in narrowing
the performance gap of poor and minority students. 60 States failing to
make adequate annual progress are initially to receive additional federal
aid to be targeted toward that end, and with continuing failure face sanc-
tions including requirements that inadequate teachers be replaced, stu-
leading "to the disastrous results of both over-identification and under-identifica-
tion of IDEA eligible children" and recommending "a clear roadmap to IDEA's
eligibility criteria and the tools to make correct eligibility decisions"); Eric Haas,
The Equal Educational Opportunity Act 30 Years Later: Time to Revisit "Appropriate Ac-
tion" for Assisting English Language Learners, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 361, 361-62 (2005)
(generally approving the so-called Castenada test requiring "English language as-
sistance programs for ELLs to be based on a sound educational theory supported
by some qualified experts" as a means to assure compliance with the Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity Act of 1974's mandate that states take "appropriate action to
overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students," while
arguing that recent judicial applications of the test have undermined the Act's
purpose by insufficiently scrutinizing school authorities' assertions of soundness
and consequently upholding "language support programs as 'appropriate action'
that likely are ineffective, and possibly harmful, to the English language develop-
ment of English language learners"); Catherine Pieronek, Title IX and Gender Equity
in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics Education: No Longer an Overlooked
Application of the Law, 31 J.C. & U.L. 291, 308 (2005) (acknowledging the contribu-
tions of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to the growth of women's
athletics over the past thirty years, while suggesting that the enforcement scheme
governing athletics "has little utility for the academic context" and noting that wo-
men remain underrepresented in particular in the STEM fields, and recom-
mending that compliance efforts focus more heavily on institutional policies and
practices negatively impacting women's choices to pursue those fields and espe-
cially that educational institutions engage in active self-assessment).
57. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-
7941).
58. See Jack Jennings, From the White House to the Schoolhouse: Greater Demands
and New Rules, in AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE ON TRIAL: CHANGES AND
CHALLENGES 291 (W. Boyd & D. Miretsky eds., 2003) (discussing the goals and
workings of No Child Left Behind and prior federal efforts to impact the quality of
education).
59. See Erin Kucerik, The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: Will It Live Up To Its
Promise?, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 479, 480 (2002) (citing initial press
release by Department of Education regarding goals of NCLB). See generally No
Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (codified at 20
U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941).
60. See Kucerik, supra note 59, at 480-81 (outlining specific requirements of
NCLB).
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dents be allowed to transfer to higher performing schools, and failing
schools be closed.6 1
While some have praised NCLB as contributing at least potentially to
improving educational opportunity,6 2 others have criticized it as ill-de-
signed and unlikely to be effective.6 3 Principal criticisms are that it pro-
vides insufficient funding to enable states and localities to meet its goal;6 4
that it fails to establish meaningful standards for evaluating student per-
formance;6 5 that it encourages states, in order to avoid sanctions, to set
inadequate standards and to induce poorly performing students to drop
61. See id. at 481 (discussing consequences for schools failing to comply with
NCLB standards).
62. See CTR. ON EDUC. POL'Y, IS THE EMPHASIS ON "PROFICIENCY" SHORTCHANG-
ING HIGHER- AND LOWER-ACHIEVING STUDENTS? 2 (2009), available at http://www.
cep-dc.org/document/docWindow.cfm?fuseaction=document.viewDocument&
documentid=280&documentFormatld=4382 (concluding that student achieve-
ment in reading and math has generally improved since 2002, that the greatest
gains have been at the proficient-and-above level with lesser gains at the basic and
advanced levels, and that "there is no strong evidence that NCLB's focus on profi-
ciency is shortchanging students at the advanced or basic levels"); Diane Ravitch &
John E. Chubb, The Future of No Child Left Behind, EDUC. NEXT, Summer 2009, at 49,
available at http://educationnext.org/the-future-of-no-child-left-behind (present-
ing a dialogue in which Chubb argues that NCLB should be retained because it "is
based on sound principles and should with time improve the achievement of all
American children, especially economically disadvantaged and racial minorities"
and because "[t]here is empirical evidence these principles are working," while
acknowledging that NCLB has some flaws and recommending adjustments).
63. See, e.g., JAEKYUNG LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIv.,
TRACKING ACHIEVEMENT GAPS AND ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF NCLB ON THE GAPS
(2006), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/esea/
nclb.naep_1ee.pdf (concluding, based on analysis of National Assessment Educa-
tional Program data, that NCLB has not significantly contributed to improving
educational achievement nor to closing the achievement gap between whites and
disadvantaged minorities); Ravitch & Chubb, supra note 62 (presenting dialogue
in which Ravitch argues that NCLB should be scrapped because it "has produced
meager gains in achievement" and "there is no reason to believe that the results
. . . will get dramatically better").
64. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Political Economy ofEducation Federalism, 56 EM-
ORY L.J. 125 (2006) (discussing the wisdom of unfunded federal coercion, and
concluding that while NCLB is not unconstitutionally coercive it is coercive from a
policy perspective); L. Darnell Weeden, Does the No Child Left Behind Law (NCLBA)
Burden the States as an Unfunded Mandate Under Federal Law?, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
239 (2006) (arguing that NCLB is unconstitutional as an unfunded federal
mandate).
65. See Richard Rothstein et al., "Proficiency for All"-An Oxymoron 2, 3, 55
(Nov. 14, 2006) (paper prepared for symposium at Teachers College, Columbia
University), available at http://epi.3cdn.net/be01cf'04e4b5391ecl_2qm6i6vlc.pdf
(arguing that the "proficiency for all" goal of NCLB is conceptually flawed because
"no goal can simultaneously be challenging to all and achievable by all students
across the entire achievement distribution"; and recommending instead, as a
means of setting "strenuous but realistic goals for improved academic achievement
by students at all points in the distribution," an approach that "would expect stu-
dents in each demographic group to perform at a higher level than they presently
do, by establishing benchmarks based on what demographically similar students,
in best practice conditions, actually do achieve").
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out of school;66 that it promotes rote learning to enable students to pass
standardized tests at the expense of teaching them to reason and think
critically;6 7 and that it is a Trojan Horse designed to undermine public
education and foster privatization. 68 However, even if successful, NCLB
will leave much of the inequality of the existing system in place. At a mini-
mum, full federal funding seems essential to providing a comparable edu-
cation for all students. Even if all students meet adequate minimum
performance standards, funding inequalities will likely persist and result in
superior educational opportunities for those living in more well-off states
and localities.
Moreover, that federal intervention has historically been needed over
the past forty-five years or so to induce states to redress unequal opportu-
nity in various aspects of education, suggests that the political process at
the federal level may in general be better suited than at the state level to
bring about more nearly comparable opportunity. Comparable opportu-
nity requires that the well-off subsidize the education of the less well-off,
66. See, e.g., Gershon M. (Gary) Ratner, Why The No Child Left Behind Act Needs
to Be Restructured to Accomplish Its Goals and How to Do It, 9 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 1
(2007) (criticizing NCLB for inducing states to lower academic standards and fail-
ing to promote systemic reform, and recommending changes to make it more ef-
fective); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of The No Child Left Behind Act, 79
N.Y.U. L. REv. 932 (2004) (criticizing NCLB for encouraging lower academic stan-
dards, deterring quality teachers, and promoting the segregation and pushing out
of poor and minority students, and recommending changes to avoid these
defects).
67. See, e.g., M. GAIL JONES ET AL., THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH-
STAKES TESTING 1-77 (2003) (critiquing the trend toward high-stakes standardized
testing, likely to intensify with NCLB, as overly emphasizing basic skills in literacy
and math at the expense of other areas of the curriculum integral to students'
overall development, and as promoting rote memorization at the expense of fos-
tering "students' thinking skills, such as problem solving and critical thinking, to
allow them to use their knowledge and skills in real-world contexts"); Jane Han-
naway & Laura Hamilton, Performance-Based Accountability Policies: Implications for
School and Classroom Practice, RESEARCH REPORT (Urban Inst., Wash., D.C.), Oct. 16,
2009, at 20-23, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411779_accountability
policies.pdf (discussing the incentive to emphasize skills that artificially inflate test
scores without increasing underlying skills and knowledge, while noting that there
is not necessarily a clear-cut distinction between the two).
68. See, e.g., Stephen Thompson, Public Education and Privatization in the Owner-
ship Society, in THE MYTH AND REALITY OF No CHILD LEFr BEHIND 89, 90, 99 (T.
Price & E. Peterson eds., 2009) (noting critiques of NCLB "as a not very well-dis-
guised effort to shift public education funding to the private sector," situating
NCLB's privatization push in the context of efforts to privatize other public pro-
grams like Social Security and Medicare, and arguing that, while school choice has
potential benefits for disadvantaged children in bad public schools, "[i]f the object
is obedience to an ideology of unfettered free markets and unchecked privatiza-
tion then initiatives like choice will serve as nothing more than a way to shift public
funds to private entities without any public oversight"); Gerald W. Bracey, The
Seven Deadly Absurdities of No Child Left Behind, NOCHILDLEFT.COM, Oct. 2004, http:/
/nochildleft.com/2004/oct04absurd.html (contending that NCLB "aims to in-
crease the use of vouchers, increase the privatization of public schools, reduce the
size of the public sector, and weaken or destroy the teachers unions").
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and that those whose children do not have costly special needs subsidize
the education of children who do. The federal government seems the
appropriate level to undertake redistributive measures for two reasons:
first, the progressivity of the federal tax system, as against the regressivity
of the sales and property taxes on which states and localities heavily rely;6 9
and, second, the ability of the well-off and of business interests to thwart
redistribution more persuasively by threatening to leave a state than to
depart the country.70 In addition, lack of comparable educational oppor-
tunity primarily prejudices disadvantaged people who also lack compara-
ble political power due to poverty or historical discrimination or being
relatively few in number. Reforms of the magnitude required to approach
comparable educational opportunity will likely require a massive reform
movement instigated by coalitions among the disadvantaged and less pow-
69. See ROBERT S. McINTYRE ET AL., INST. ON TAXATION AND EcoN. POL'Y, WHO
PAYS? A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES (2d ed.
2003), available at http://www.itepnet.org/wp2000/text.pdf (finding as of the
early 2000s that, due to the heavy reliance on the somewhat regressive property tax
and highly regressive sales tax, most state tax systems were regressive and that
changes in local and state taxes over the prior decade had made them even more
regressive); JEFFREY ROHALY, TAX POL'Y CTR., URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., THE
DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL TAXES, 2008-11, at 1, available at http://www.tax
policycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001189 federaltaxes.pdf ("Overall, the federal
tax system is highly progressive. On average, households with higher incomes pay
taxes that are a larger share of their income. The tax cuts passed since 2001 have
reduced the overall progressivity of the federal tax system with the notable excep-
tion of the stimulus package passed in early 2008. The tax rebates in the stimulus
legislation are in effect for 2008 only, however, and so the progressivity of the tax
system will decline markedly in 2009 and 2010 as effective tax rates rise substan-
tially for lower and moderate-income households. At the same time, effective rates
will fall for high-income households as the repeal of the limitations on itemized
deductions and personal exemptions and the complete repeal of the estate tax
become fully phased in. Finally, almost all provisions of the 2001-06 tax cuts are
set to expire at the end of 2010. Barring legislative action, effective tax rates will
therefore rise across the income spectrum in 2011. The largest increases will be in
the upper income classes and so the tax system will become more progressive in
2011 unless the tax cuts are made permanent."); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel
Saez, How Progressive Is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and International
Perspective, 21 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVEs 3, 22 (2007), available at http://
elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/piketty-saezjEP07taxprog.pdf (finding that due to de-
clines in the corporate, estate, and gift tax rates "the progressivity of the U.S. fed-
eral tax system at the top of the income distribution has declined dramatically
since the 1960s").
70. See, e.g., KirkJ. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal
Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1389, 1393-94
(2004) ("As has long been recognized in the literature on fiscal federalism, subna-
tional governments are constrained in their ability to impose redistributive taxes
because taxpayers may simply choose to leave the jurisdiction to avoid the tax....
In effect, by threat of exit, mobile taxpayers can demand price-like 'benefit taxes'
and thereby avoid becoming the subjects of state or local efforts to redistribute
income. One normative prescription flowing from this analysis is that, in a federal
system of governments, redistributive policies should be undertaken exclusively by
the most central level of government.").
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erful. 7n Such coalitions seem more likely to be effective at the federal
level where greater numbers can be brought to bear and more attention
shone on the needed changes.
C. The Need for Greater Federal Intervention
Under the inegalitarian conditions prevailing in this society, the re-
quirements of equitable sharing and comparable educational opportunity
demand a greater federal role than to date. Let's consider three possible
forms the federalization of education could take. I assume for the time
being that the federal government will not institute a nation-wide voucher
system, and that most children will continue to attend traditional public
schools or government-funded charter schools. The three models, with
federal intervention at its least in the first model and increasing thereafter,
are: (1) full federal financing of the existing state and local system; (2) the
federal takeover of the states' primary role in superintending a decentral-
ized system of public schools that are federally funded but of which locally
elected governments and officials are responsible for day-to-day manage-
ment pursuant to federal standards; and (3) the total federalization of
public education with schools being financed by the federal government
and run by a federal agency based in Washington, D.C.
1. (1) Full Federal Financing
One means of federal financing is through block grants, with the fed-
eral government providing funds to states to be spent only on education
but with no other strings attached, and with states being responsible for
disbursing the funds to local education agencies. This approach would
work only if the federal money were used to institute comparable educa-
tional programs within and among the states. This seems unlikely without
additional federal control.7 2 Within states, the political power of the well-
off might tilt the distribution of federal money in their favor. Even if the
money were distributed in an evenhanded way, it seems likely that well-off
states and localities would, as they now do, choose to raise additional funds
to enhance the quality of their children's education beyond what the less
well-off states and localities could afford.
71. See, e.g., Thomas Kleven, Systemic Classism, Systemic Racism: Are Social and
Racial justice Achievable in the United States?, 8 Corm. PUB. INrr. L.J. 207, 238-53
(2009) (arguing that a mass movement of working class people of all ethnicities is
necessary to achieve social and racial justice in the United States).
72. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and
Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 297 (1996)
(discussing the merits and demerits as an approach to federal financing of block
grants containing minimal federal strings and designed to move governmental ac-
countability closer to the people and to promote greater flexibility and responsive-
ness in program design, as against categorical grants and entitlement programs
containing programmatic requirements designed to ensure that federal goals are
met and program beneficiaries are served).
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Federal strings requiring an evenhanded distribution of the funds
and forbidding supplementation might prevent these deviations. How-
ever, states and localities would still have the right to decline federal
money and operate free from federal control. Whether any would do so
in order to avoid federal strings is hard to say. Because state residents
would still have to pay federal taxes for education, there would be an in-
centive to accept the money. On the other hand, if evenhandedly distrib-
uted federal money were less than what individual states or localities were
previously spending, some might forego it in order to provide their chil-
dren the advantage of a superior education. If not, and if states and locali-
ties are better suited than the federal government to administer public
education due to the arguable advantages of state and local control in
responding to children's diverse needs, then block grants with strings re-
quiring evenhanded distribution and prohibiting supplementation might
advance the goal of comparable educational opportunity.
2. (2) Federal Takeover of the States' Role
The federal takeover of the states' current role in superintending
public education would effectively make local school districts agencies of
the federal government, at least for purposes of providing public educa-
tion. In addition to financing education and supplying funds directly to
local districts, the federal government would supplant the states in regulat-
ing the quality of education provided by the local districts. Decisions as to
whether and to what extent to regulate curriculum, teacher qualifications,
and other aspects of the educational process would now be in federal
hands, presumably via a federal department of education operating much
like today's state school boards.
Whether state or federal oversight of local school districts is prefera-
ble seems an open question. On the one hand, state elected and ap-
pointed officials may be more responsive than federal officials to their
children's educational needs, a state-local partnership may operate more
efficiently than a federal-local partnership, and state oversight may enable
needed experimentation with a greater variety of educational approaches
than under a more uniform federal approach. On the other hand, as dis-
cussed above, it may be easier to overcome entrenched political power
impeding needed reforms at the federal than at the state level. For exam-
ple, state initiatives to bring about more racial and class integration have
been limited and largely unsuccessful, due in large part to the political
power of suburban areas in state legislatures.7 3 Perhaps the federal gov-
73. Two states, Massachusetts and Connecticut, have laws requiring local
school authorities to correct racial imbalance in their schools. See MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 71, § 37D (West 2009); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-226a to -226h
(West 2002 & Supp. 2009). I have been unable to find data on the success of these
laws. Depending on the details of how the laws operate, they may run afoul of the
Supreme Court's invalidation of race-conscious integration plans in Parents In-
volved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). A possible altema-
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ernment could achieve greater success, as with the federal promotion of
equal educational opportunity in other respects today.
3. (3) Total Federalization
Federal control would be greatest with total federalization, the aboli-
tion of local school districts, the creation of a federal school system admin-
istered by a federal agency, and mandatory attendance at the federal
schools. Being responsible for financing education and in control of how
much is spent on each child, the agency could endeavor to allocate funds
equitably among all students. Being responsible for assigning students to
schools, the agency could institute attendance plans designed to promote
class and racial integration. Being responsible for curriculum, the agency
could establish standards designed to provide a comparable educational
opportunity to students nationwide. In order to gain the benefits of de-
centralization, the agency could manage schools through regional offices
and local school superintendents, could delegate to them the authority to
tailor educational programs to meet their students' needs, and could pro-
vide for parental involvement in the decision-making process in order to
promote responsiveness and accountability. But these officials would ulti-
mately be responsible to the central agency, and whatever benefits flow
from the local election or appointment of school officials would be lost.
Moreover, those opposed to total federalization and able to afford it might
opt out of the system for private schools, thereby undermining the bene-
fits of federalization.
In sum, all three models or variations of them-full federal financing,
the federal takeover of the states' role, and total federalization-might
promote more nearly comparable educational opportunity than the pre-
sent reliance on state and local governments. At a minimum, full federal
financing of public schools seems necessary. Whether the displacement of
tive to race-based integration is class-based plans, which have been adopted
voluntarily by several local school districts but as yet have not been mandated by
any states. See, e.g., RicHARD D. KAHLENBERG, RESCUING BROWN V. BOARD OF EDuCA-
TION PROFILES OF TWELVE SCHOOL DisRIucrs PURSUING SOCIOECONOMIc SCHOOL
INTEGRATION (2007), available at http://www.tcf.org/publications/education/
districtprofiles.pdf (describing socio-economic integration plans in twelve of ap-
proximately forty school districts using them, and concluding that properly de-
signed plans can promote racial integration and boost academic achievement).
However, as a practical matter many school districts, particularly in central cities,
have so few white and middle-to-upper income students that achieving racial and
class integration is impossible. See, e.g., ORFIELD & LEE, INTEGRATION STRATEGIES,
supra note 46. Achieving integration in those settings will likely require opening
up to those trapped in central cities the suburban communities in which middle to
upper income families have insulated themselves. Only a few state legislatures
have taken steps to combat the exclusionary zoning barriers many suburban com-
munities have adopted to preserve their insularity, and only with modest success.
See, e.g., Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1, 72-85 (2001) (arguing that the few state legislative efforts to com-
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the states' role through federal takeover, or of both the state and local
roles through total federalization, is needed depends on the relative effec-
tiveness of the three levels of government in administering the various
aspects of public education other than financing. That is a question which
can only be answered in practice and about which there will likely be con-
tinuing disagreement.
D. The Validity and Viability of a Greater Federal Role
An increased federal role may be necessary, but whether it is legally
valid or politically viable is another matter. The validity of all the models
depends on the scope of federal power. The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Tenth Amendment's protection of states' rights to forbid the
federal government from ordering states to pass laws or implement federal
programs. 74 Consequently, the federal government could not simply man-
date states and localities to run their educational systems in accordance
with federal standards. So far the Court has not used the Tenth Amend-
ment to limit the federal spending power. Thus, strings attached to fed-
eral money, as with most of the existing federal interventions into public
education, is currently an available route.7 5 Whether the Court would in-
74. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that requirement
of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that state law enforcement officers
conduct background checks of prospective gun purchasers impermissibly intrudes
on state sovereignty implicit in the Constitution); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992) (holding requirement of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
that states failing to regulate the disposal of waste generated within the state must
take title to and possession of the waste effectively mandates states to pass laws to
implement federal law in violation of Tenth Amendment).
75. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (authorizing Congress to tax and spend to
"provide for the ... general welfare of the United States"). While the Supreme
Court could conceivably strike down a statute as somehow not in furtherance of
the general welfare, it has not done so and has taken the position that "[i]n consid-
ering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public pur-
poses, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress." South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). It is hard to imagine the Court ever
invalidating spending to promote public education as not serving the general wel-
fare. Moreover, as long as Congress clearly expresses its intent, the Court has ac-
knowledged that Congress has broad power to attach conditions to federal money
on the ground that states need not accept the money and are in effect contractu-
ally bound if they do. See David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spend-
ing Power, 52 S. DAK. L. REv. 496 (2007) (discussing contract law rationale for
conditions on states' receipt of federal funds). While intimating that it might in-
validate conditions insufficiently related to the purpose of the funded program, see
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207, the Court has never actually done so and this limitation
would seem to pose no obstacle to conditions regulating the educational programs
for which federal money has been appropriated. Conditions are valid even if Con-
gress otherwise lacks the power to directly regulate the matter. See id. (upholding
condition attached to federal highway funding that states impose minimum drink-
ing age, even assuming the Twenty-First Amendment bars Congress from directly
doing so). Conditions are valid even when conferring on local government powers
denied under state law. See Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-
1, 469 U.S. 256, 258 (1985) (holding that Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act provision
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voke the Tenth Amendment if the federal government tried to use the
spending power to fully finance public education and prohibit state and
local supplementation, to take over the states' role in superintending local
school districts, or to totally federalize education and establish a federal
public school system, is hard to say and likely depends on the ideological
tilt of the Court at the time. The basis of a decision striking down federal
intervention would likely be that public education is a traditional state
function that the federal government may control to a limited degree but
not so extensively as per the three models.76 While such a decision is cer-
tainly conceivable, my view is that the extent of the federal role should be
treated as a political question, on the ground that tradition should not
stand in the way of progress in education and that the political process is
the appropriate place to resolve whether an increased federal role would
be progressive.7 7
The political will for an increased federal role of the scope envisioned
here does not seem likely at the present time. However, it is possible that
the country is entering an era of greater reliance on the federal govern-
ment for matters of national significance. The effort to adopt some form
of universal health insurance is an example. Most people view access to
health care and education as matters of high and roughly comparable pri-
ority.7 8 If universal health insurance comes about, it will occur due to
authorizing local governments to use funds received under the Act for "any gov-
ernmental purpose" overrides state statute requiring local governments to dis-
tribute federal payments in lieu of taxes in the same way they distribute general tax
revenues).
76. For a similar argument regarding the minimum wage, see Nat'l League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (holding Congress may not regulate mini-
mum wages of state and local governmental employees under the Commerce
Clause, and stating that "insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly
displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art.
I, § 8, cl. 3"), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
77. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAPMAN L.
REv. 89, 89 (2001) (arguing that "Congress's spending power should be broadly
interpreted" and that "the Tenth Amendment should not be applied as a limit on
the spending power or on Congress's ability to place conditions on its spending");
Aviam Soifer, Truisms that Never Will Be True: The Tenth Amendment and the Spending
Power, 52 U. COLo. L. REv. 793, 800 (1986) (arguing that "the Tenth Amendment
provides no constitutionally enforceable barrier against congressional action").
But see Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAPMAN L.
REv. 195, 198 (2001) (arguing that "the modern Congress regularly uses fiscal re-
distribution among the states and conditional federal spending to impinge, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, on the autonomy that the Framers sought to guarantee
the states," that "these intrusions on state autonomy reduce aggregate social wel-
fare," that "the states cannot protect themselves through the federal political pro-
cess against Congress's exercise of its spending power," and that the Court should
be willing to limit Congress's spending power in order to protect states' rights).
78. In public opinion polls Americans consistently rank education and health
care among their highest priorities. See PollingReport.com, Problems and Priori-
ties, http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
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public recognition that the private market has not adequately met the
need for a good as fundamental as health care. If the public were to come
to see the existing educational system as similarly inadequate, federal in-
tervention might become viable.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to federal intervention is the tradition-
ally primary role of state and local government in public education. That
tradition may have been sensible at a time when wealth inequalities were
not as great or as entrenched as today, when education may not have been
quite as central to success in life as today, and when states and localities
were less interdependent. Tradition can linger even after the conditions
giving rise to it have changed and are no longer applicable. Because it
represents at least a modest break with tradition, the adoption of No Child
Left Behind seems significant in this regard. If greater federal interven-
tion comes about in the future, No Child Left Behind will likely be seen as
the first step down that path. If No Child Left Behind ends up being
scrapped as a failed federal intervention, then the existing system is likely
to endure for some time.
VI. CONCLUSION
Democratic principles, the inherently equal moral worth of all peo-
ple, and the requirement of equitable sharing mandate that society afford
all children a comparable educational opportunity suited to their needs.
In a society as inegalitarian as the United States, comparability requires
governmental provision of education. And it requires federal provision at
least to the extent of financing the full cost of education, and perhaps
more so depending on its capacity as against state and local governments
of promoting comparability in other respects. Federal provision will only
come about, though, through a mass movement of those in this country
whose children do not have comparable opportunity. Without such a
movement, the inequalities of the educational system as presently struc-
tured will likely persist indefinitely.
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